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Abstract:  Drawing on unpublished and published sources from 1926-1932, this chapter builds on 
John Dewey’s naturalistic pragmatic pluralism in ethical theory.  A primary focus is “Three 
Independent Factors in Morals,” which analyzes good, duty, and virtue as distinct categories that 
in many cases express different experiential origins.  The chapter suggests that a vital role for 
contemporary theorizing is to lay bare and analyze the sorts of conflicts that constantly underlie 
moral and political action.  Instead of reinforcing moral fundamentalism via an outdated quest 
for the central and basic source of normative justification, we should foster theories with a range 
of idioms and emphases which, while accommodating monistic insights, better inform decision-
making by opening communication across diverse elements of moral and political life, placing 
these elements in a wider context in which norms gain practical traction in non-ideal conditions, 
and expanding prospects for social inquiry and convergence on policy and action.   
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Even as we confront increasingly complex problems that demand fine awareness, moral 
sensitivity, and rich responsibility (see Nussbaum 1990, 148-167), many have inherited a stark 
one-way-street moral and political mentality:  Those going the right way (“us”) feel constantly 
endangered by others (“them”) coming the wrong way, and each is convinced that the other has 
misread the signs.  Such moral fundamentalist habits can cause people to oversimplify situations, 
neglect context, assume privileged access to the right way to proceed, ignore relevant 
possibilities for convergence, and shut off inquiry (Johnson 2014; Norton 2015).  Moral 
fundamentalism, which logically requires the traditional monistic view that there is a single right 
or ideal way to formulate moral and political problems, also makes the worst of our native 
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impulses toward social bonding and antagonism, driving the us-them wedge even deeper and 
depleting social capital (Putnam 2000) while making it harder for us to debate and achieve 
controverted social goals like justice, freedom, security, health, and sustainability (see Thompson 
2010).
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  Meanwhile, exacerbating the one-way moral mentality, techno-industrial civilizations 
have arranged social networks and media communications into an infamous echo chamber that 
insulates “us” from having to learn anything new from “them” (Karsten and West 2016).   
We must cultivate better cultural and cross-cultural conditions for dialogue, debate, and 
persuasion so that we can deal more intelligently and competently with complex and widely 
shared local, regional, national, and global problems (cf. 1927, LW 2:366).  Over a century after 
Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916, MW 9), faith in the educative capacity of experience 
remains our best hope.  Social inquiry and problem-solving are more honest, open, collaborative, 
rigorous, and productive when youths learn to be patient with the suspense of reflection, 
distrustful of tunnel vision, aware of the fallibility and incompleteness of any decision or policy, 
practiced in listening, and imaginative in pursuing creative leads.   
Philosophical research can help to create a shared cultural context in which we cultivate 
these conditions for sustained, communicative social inquiry.  Drawing on unpublished and 
published sources from 1926-1932, this chapter builds on Dewey to argue that traditional ethical 
monism tends to stymie this creative possibility by legitimizing the “one way” feature of moral 
fundamentalism and that a deep pragmatic pluralism can accommodate valuable monistic 
insights without unduly exercising and reinforcing moral fundamentalist habits.
2
  
Dewey’s Pragmatic Pluralism in Ethical Theory 
In ethics, pluralism implies affirmation of multiple values.  Strong pluralists such as Williams 
(1985), Taylor (1982), Noddings (2013), and Appiah (2017) hold that ethical monism abridges 
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moral life and edits out the diversity of situational tensions that mark real, unsettled 
circumstances.
3
   
Values typically conflict and get in the way of each other, and, according to the strong 
pluralist it would be an exceptionally easy case in which tensions could be resolved by appealing 
to a supreme value, principle, standard, law, concept, or ideal that devours whatever is of moral 
worth in the rest of our concerns.  A strong pluralist position is well stated by Haidt and 
Bjorklund:  “Monistic theories are likely to be wrong.  …If there are many independent sources 
of moral value…, then moral theories that value only one source and set to zero all others are 
likely to produce psychologically unrealistic systems…” (2008, 215).4   
Strong pluralists, especially in the pragmatist tradition, also tend to reject the quest for a 
self-sufficient “ideal theory,” as Rawls (1971) called his idealized “original position” approach 
to a well-ordered society in which free, equal, and autonomous rational contractors fully comply 
with the requirements of justice.
5
  This now-traditional ideal theory approach is exemplified by 
Rawls, Nozick (1974), and arguably Dworkin (2000).  Recent critics include, to various degrees, 
Mills (2005, 2017), Anderson (2009, 2013), Pappas (2008, 2018), Sen (2009), Valentini (2012), 
and Appiah (2017).  Anderson, for example, has influentially argued that Rawls’s approach to an 
ideal society blinds us to race-based and other social injustices to a degree that is 
“epistemologically disabling” (2013, 5).6  These strong pluralists propose shifting to a non-ideal 
starting point for sociopolitical inquiry.  They do not, of course, object to idealizations in ethics, 
a subject recently canvassed in Appiah’s As If:  Idealization and Ideals (2017), but they do insist 
that values have to be appraised in light of the particular experiential contexts and purposes that 
generated them, and most advocate, in Pappas’s (2018) words, a shift “toward a more nonideal, 
contextualist, problem-centered, and inquiry-oriented approach.”  Pappas writes:  “There are as 
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many problems of injustice,” Pappas writes, “as there are problematic situations suffered in a 
particular way.”  And even a plausible ideal theory, Appiah urges in his melioristic plea for non-
ideal (partial compliance) theories, “doesn’t help much in the circumstances of an actual non-
ideal world” (2017, 120; cf. 163). 
Among pragmatists, such as Kitcher (2014), Johnson (2014), McKenna (2018), Pappas 
(2018), Thompson (2015), and myself (2003), pluralism is additionally an experimental method 
of moral and political inquiry.  But pragmatism is not necessarily “a method of ethics” in the 
sense crystallized by Sidgwick:  “a rational procedure for deciding what we ought to do” (Lazari-
Radek and Singer 2014).  Norton’s “heuristic proceduralism” comes close (2005, 2015), but like 
other pragmatists he is critical of rational procedures that fail to fathom the extent to which we 
are all frogs in Zhuǎng Zǐ’s well, inescapably limited and guided by our particular standpoints, 
contexts, and purposes.  Moreover, like Kitcher and Johnson, Norton is focused on ethical 
inquiry as an experimental process rather than merely as incessant verbal argumentation.  What 
Kitcher (2014) calls “the ethical project” is a process in which, as Johnson explains it, we 
actively try out “various modes of behavior (verbal and nonverbal), various institutional 
structures, and various life strategies.”  Verbal forms of argumentation remain important for 
philosophical ethics, but ethical theorists have neglected the way experiments in living also 
constitute “arguments” for and against various practices.  Certain practices either address or fail 
to meet shared problems.  Such “arguments,” Johnson adds, are enactive embodied, and 
embedded (Johnson 2014, 126), and they should be more central to the future of ethical 
theorizing. 
Our actual experiments in living assuredly involve ideals and idealizations through which 
we appraise moral alternatives, as Appiah has argued (2017), but they must proceed without 
5 
 
access to a non-contingent perspective or an ideal standpoint untainted by particular human 
drives, habits, and choices.  Ethical inquiry is unended, and what we count as progressive or 
regressive is ultimately, in Kitcher’s words, “something people work out with one another.  
There are no experts here” (2014, 286).  Instead of another iteration of the old escape through 
faith or reason to an antecedently established “aperspectival position” (Johnson 2014, 120), the 
pragmatic pluralist embraces in her methodology the fact that when we ask different questions, 
we see different connections and possibilities.  As is often observed, to ask the Kantian question 
(What is my duty?) or the utilitarian question (Which actions help us do the most good we can 
do?) is not to ask the Aristotelian question (Which character traits contribute to the eudaemon 
life?).  To appropriate Heisenberg, what we observe is not the moral situation in itself, but the 
situation exposed to our method of questioning (see 1958, 32).   
Nevertheless, as Kitcher and Johnson observe, rejection of aperspectival ethics “in no 
way keeps us from making reasonable claims about” the relative suitability of certain “values, 
principles, and practices” over others (Johnson 2014, 129; Kitcher 2014, 210).  Given our actual 
contingent and non-ideal starting point, pluralism is a strategy for more conscientious moral and 
political inquiry into what we should deem progressive and regressive, especially, I have argued, 
when our moral deliberations and choices are informed by broadly attentive, vital, and 
appreciative imaginative rehearsals and moral artistry (Fesmire 2003).  If comparison to an ideal 
world of agents fully compliant with the demands of justice makes us more sensitive to the 
particular pinch of an injustice and helps us singly or collectively hunt for ways to settle 
difficulties, creatively scope out alternatives, and picture ourselves taking part in them, then for 
the pragmatic pluralist it is a valuable heuristic.  But it is the wrong starting point.  
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Dewey built on his more general theory of operative intelligence to chart a course making 
the best of our inescapable contingency and provincialism.  He contended that no matter how 
carefully elaborated one’s supreme moral principle (e.g., Gewirth 1978), it will rarely focus 
one’s attention on all the relevant situational factors that one ought to note and deal with.  He 
shared the spirit of James’s pluralism: “The word ‘and’ trails after every sentence.  Something 
always escapes. ‘Ever not quite’ has to be said of the best attempts made anywhere in the 
universe at attaining all-inclusiveness” (1977, 145).  The problem with ethical monism is not just 
that its usefulness to moral understanding is limited; indeed, the articulation of one-sided 
idealizations of incompatible theories may be a personal or collective help in specific contexts 
(see Appiah 2017).  What is worse, from the standpoint of Deweyan moral epistemology, is that 
the traditional monistic quest for a single rational ruler to impose order on deliberation tends, as 
an unintended consequence, to enable the one-way feature of moral fundamentalism.  More 
specifically, far from being an antidote to what J. Baird Callicott wittily dubs pluralism’s 
“multiple personality disorder,” monism tends to obstruct individual and communal inquiry into 
relevant situational features that “escape” our often-useful abstractions and idealizations.  Of 
course monistic ethical theorists, in sharp contrast with prototypical fundamentalists, usually 
believe they have much to learn from those who disagree with them.  But traditional monists 
hold that their moral house can, with some renovations and touch-ups here and there, fully 
accommodate whatever they need to learn.  Using Dewey as a platform, I am arguing that it 
cannot.  Even when we are aware, like Nozick, that we are “idealizing greatly” (1974, 151; cf. 
Appiah 2017, 119), we may be taken in by the putative value of our armchair theoretic clarities 
at the price of rendering actual moral and political problems more opaque. 
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Dewey asserted that “the growth of the experimental as distinct from the dogmatic habit 
of mind is due to increased ability to utilize variations for constructive ends instead of 
suppressing them” (1929, LW 1:7).7  Accordingly, he saw variability in valuing and valuations 
as a useful starting point for further inquiry, rather than as a worrisome deviation to be squelched 
or intellectually standardized in the name of ethical truth.  He held that there is no universal 
compass that allows us to rationally (or faithfully) navigate the social world, but through ongoing 
shared inquiry we can nevertheless steer reliably between the absolute and the arbitrary (cf. Elgin 
1997).  
As Dewey framed his pluralistic ethical theory, his central questions were:  When we are 
morally conflicted, is this a superficial hesitancy that would invariably dissolve if only we could 
conduct our reasoning correctly, marshal the right data, or pray harder?  Or is the experience of 
moral conflict often rooted in something deeper and intractable, a conflict intrinsic to the 
situation?  Are a plurality of approaches to moral decision-making justified, or should we strive 
for a one-size-fits-all approach that organizes moral cognition under a single blanket category of 
good, right, or virtue?  Do these blanket concepts spring from the same empirical source in our 
moral experience, or do they express distinctive roots of moral life?  If leading moral concepts 
express independent forces with different roots, do these roots ultimately jibe well with each 
other (i.e., are they fully compatible)?  Or do they get at cross purposes, often pulling us in 
different and seemingly legitimate directions, leaving us in a muddle about what to do?  In sum, 
are there inherent conflicts as well as practical incommensurabilities between underlying 
primitive springs of moral action?  If so, how can we practically manage and evaluate the 
normative claims made on us by these forces? 
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Dewey’s partial and typically-for-him-programmatic answer to these questions pivoted 
on the thesis that there are “independent variables in moral action” (1930, LW 5:280), these 
several experiential factors are in tension with each other, and they are reducible neither to a 
single right or ideal starting point for moral inquiry nor to an ultimate foundation tethered to 
changeless universal truths.  He did not simply assert the platitude that each vying monistic 
model has some truth to it; he developed and explored a hypothesis partially explaining how 
conflicting persistent values relate to one another and how they might be put into communication 
with each other without being hypostatized.  Or alternatively, he suggested how functionally 
isolated theories might be critically appraised within a wider normative context even as they 
sustain their distinctive selective emphases as idealized partial mappings or models of the 
terrain of moral action.  When divergent models of normative ideals are held to be true 
“independent of what they lead to when used as directive principles” (QC, LW 4:221), 
dogmatism results.  But when normative models are understood as communicative and revisable 
experiments in living, as what Dewey in The Quest for Certainty called instrumentalities of 
direction, then he thinks they will mature through ongoing interactive engagement with the world 
and be truer to the mark.
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In the remainder of this chapter I explore Dewey’s thesis, from its inception as a 
hypothesis in the 1920s to its elaboration in the early 1930s.  Several standout features of 
Dewey’s brand of strong axiological pluralism will play a role in subsequent analysis:  Dewey’s 
theory rejects aperspectival positions and is marked by a naturalistic emphasis on the embodied 
context of moral action as a need-search recovery process (see Johnson 2018).  He consequently 
emphasized conscientiousness, not native conscience, and he rejected the split between a moral 
realm sharply marked off from a non-moral realm, observing that actions are so interconnected 
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that any choice potentially has moral significance (1932, LW 7:170).  He avoided extreme moral 
skepticism and extreme moral particularism (see Pappas 2018), and his outlook concurs with 
more recent strong pluralists that moral problems often admit of more than one approvable 
solution.   
Moving to the four features central to what follows, (a) Dewey argued that moral 
uncertainty is often a sign of conscientiousness’;  (b) this uncertainty arises in part from conflicts 
between heterogeneous sources of moral action—irreducible basic factors in morals—to which 
reasonable moral agents ought to pay attention; (c) our choices and deeds are essential players in 
the moral situation, so what is good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious cannot be 
completely ascertained prior to acting and experimentally reviewing;
9
 (d) although moral clarity 
and conviction are important (see Neiman 2008), moral fundamentalism robs them of their virtue 
and should be rejected in all forms, no matter how sophisticated, because there is no one right or 
ideal way to think in advance about moral or political problems and hence rarely a single 
“theoretically correct” diagnosis of any particular moral or political problem. 
Three Independent Factors in Morals 
On November 7, 1930, Dewey gave an address in English before the French Philosophical 
Society in Paris.  As his French colleagues recognized in the ensuing discussion, he gave them “a 
première of his new ideas” (quoted in LW 5:503).  The presentation was promptly published as 
“Trois facteurs indépendants en matière de morale.”10  In the 1960s, Jo Ann Boydston translated 
the French article back into English for Educational Theory as “Three Independent Factors in 
Morals,” which eventually appeared in the critical edition (LW 5:279-288). 
Soon after Boydston’s translation appeared, an unpublished and undated typescript 
(mss102_53_3) was found in the Dewey archives at Southern Illinois University, titled in 
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Dewey’s hand “Conflict and Independent Variables in Morals” (figure 10.1).11  <place fig. 10.1 on 
the facing page opposite the callout; credit below image should read:  Used by permission of Special 
Collections, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.>    The first five pages of the 
typescript were likely presented in 1926 or 1927 to a philosophy club at Columbia University 
(Dewey to Horace S. Fries [1933.12.26 (07682)]).  Pages 6 to 12 closely track the French article, 
but there are several substantive revisions in Dewey’s hand that do not appear in the critical 
edition.  Pages 1 to 5 and page 13 remain unpublished.  Dewey was likely reworking the 
typescript for an English publication.  He instead incorporated the basic insights into the 1932 
Ethics (LW 7), albeit in a less theoretical form that he judged to be better suited to the 
pedagogical and practical needs of undergraduate students (Dewey to Horace S. Fries 
[1933.12.26 (07682)].  In what follows, I incorporate material from the unpublished typescript 
whenever it offers a unique angle or metaphor that clarifies a point or adds something 
philosophically substantive.  
In the 1930 presentation, Dewey hypothesized that each of the primary Western ethical 
systems (represented for him by Aristotle, Kant, and the British moralists) represents a basic, 
non-arbitrary force or factor of moral life:  aspiration, obligation, and approbation, respectively.  
Each factor is expressed in that system’s leading fundamental concept:  good, duty, and virtue, 
respectively.  Each system seeks to bring divergent forces wholly within the logical scope of its 
own monistic category or principle.  Other factors are subordinated and treated as derivative.  
For example, Kantians declare a trait to be virtuous because it maps to what is antecedently 
determined by autonomous reason to be right or obligatory.  Yet, as examined here, Dewey 
contended that aspirations, obligations, and approbations are distinctive phenomena that cannot 
be blanketed by a single covering concept.   
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The subject matter of ethics is popularly taken to be about getting people to do the right 
thing when they are otherwise inclined.  Accordingly, easy and uncomplicated cases such as 
“Should he embezzle the money?” are often spotlighted as prototypical, even though such cases 
are not usually occasions for much deliberation.  Dewey recognized untangled cases in which 
habituated rule-following is best and excessive deliberation a waste of time, or worse, signifies a 
manically imbalanced character (1932, LW 7:170).  Such trade-offs are unavoidable.  
Moreoever, although Anscombe in her watershed “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) put it far 
more succinctly with her exceptionless prohibition against murdering the innocent, Dewey 
recognized that deliberation can at times lead us into temptation via ad hoc rationalizations (cf. 
Appiah 2017, 132).  Additionally, recent moral psychology has revealed—with an experimental 
rigor that Dewey again left programmatic—the extent to which “moral reasoning” too often 
amounts to little more than a self-justifying ineffectual “rider” atop the headstrong “elephant” of 
habituated intuitions (Haidt 2012).  
Any adequate defense of Dewey’s general position requires some hedging of this sort, but 
his opening assertion in the 1930 presentation is uncomplicated:  moral situations are not just 
occasions for uncertainty about what to do; problematic moral situations more typically justify 
our uncertainty.  “Moral experience is a genuine experience” of real, systemic conflicts (in Koch 
2010, 2.2270), so we generally ought to be reflective.  And yet, Dewey argued, traditional moral 
theories have treated moral conflict as specious.  Moral philosophers have acknowledged angst, 
but with their “Special Powers in their Special Armchairs” (Kitcher 2012, xix) they have for the 
most part postulated “one single principle as an explanation of moral life” (1930, LW 5:280), a 




Because morally uncertain situations require us to reconcile conflicting factors, Dewey 
urged that “It is not without significance that uncertainty is felt most keenly by those who are 
called conscientious” (Dewey, undated ms, 13).  Should a fifteen-year-old girl have an abortion?  
Should a soldier shoot upon command?  Should a security analyst blow the whistle on 
government intrusions into privacy?  Should John have had the affair with Anzia?  To see these 
questions through the lens of only one factor—as at bottom a matter of rights not downstream 
consequences, of duty not virtue, of what is right not what is good, of what I should do and not 
who I should become—risks bringing deliberation to a premature close.  When competing 
monistic concepts vie as bottom lines, this can of course elicit fruitful tension and dialogue.  
Pluralists, for their part, disagree with each other no less emphatically, but they are also 
committed in principle to nuanced perception and engaged problem-solving because they are 
keenly aware that their diagnoses have not precisely captured all that is morally or politically 
relevant.  
Under the “one way” assumption legitimized by traditional ethical theorizing, conflict 
and diversity are merely apparent.  A real situation may seem to be a quagmire, the supposition 
runs, but closer examination, or more data, or comparison to an ideally just or egalitarian island 
world of rational albeit hapless contractors (see Dworkin 2000), will reveal that there had been a 
right or fair path through it all along.  Uncertainty is seen mostly as a “hesitation about choice” 
between the moral and the immoral:  we assume we must choose the good (vs. evil), will the 
obligatory (vs. giving way to appetite, inclination, and desire), or do the virtuous (vs. the 
vicious).  “That is the necessary logical conclusion if moral action has only one source, if it 
ranges only within a single category” (1930, LW 5:280).  “We may be in doubt as to what the 
good or the right or the virtuous is in a complicated situation,” but under the restrictive one-way 
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assumption “it is there and determination of it is at most a purely intellectual question, not a 
moral one.  There is no conflict inhering in the situation” (Dewey, undated ms, 3). 
Yet conflicts are rarely so superficial that a correct rational analysis could, even in 
principle, sweep the path clear toward what is “truly” good, right, just, or virtuous.  In Latour’s 
(1993) terms, “imbroglios” typify moral experience:  moral predicaments are entanglements of 
often-incompatible forces.  We are typically tugged in multiple ways, so one-way theorizing or 
decision-making at best leads to normative prescriptions that ignore factors relevant to our 




Dewey acknowledged that “he exaggerated, for purposes of discussion, the differences 
among the three factors, that indeed moral theories do touch on these three factors more or less, 
but what he wanted to emphasize was the fact that each particular moral theory takes one of them 
as central and that is what becomes the important point, while the other factors are only 
secondary” (1930, LW 5:503).  His point, then, was that there is a false hidden premise driving 
all projects that claim to give an account of metaethics and normative morality in terms of one 
supreme root.  Each primary system misses, at least at the theoretical level, the inherent conflicts 
that constantly underlie moral and political action as irreducible forces, as when desired goods 
conflict with binding social demands.  We should instead foster ethical and political theories that 
(a) lay bare and classify these practical conflicts within a wider “framework of moral 
conceptions” that puts basic roots in communication (1932, LW 7:309); (b) place these elements 
in a wider experimental context in which norms—e.g., responsibility, self-respect, and 
authenticity, for Dworkin (2011)—gain practical traction in the entanglements of nonideal 





Note, importantly, that Dewey nowhere reduced moral life to a triumvirate of root 
factors; he did not have a universal, cover-all ethical theory.  He wanted to emphasize that, 
having long ago unseated the monarch of custom, Western moral philosophers continue to 
contest which monarch of reason shall rule from the old throne and issue truths about how we 
ought to live.  What philosophers should do, in contrast, is to surrender the monarchical quest 
altogether so that we might “attend more fully to the concrete elements entering into the 
situations” in which we must act (1930, LW 5:288).  In philosophy as in agriculture, we are in 
need of more polyculture, to borrow Vandana Shiva’s image, not more monoculture.  
Dewey’s central question in the 1930 presentation was:  Is there a single empirical source 
of moral action, or are there plural sources?  His hypothesis was that moral problems require us 
to reconcile and coordinate “heterogeneous elements” (in Koch 2010, 2.2270) that include “at 
least three independent variables in moral action” (1930, LW 5:280) which “pull different ways” 
(Dewey, undated ms, 4).  The variables are independent in the sense that one variable is neither 
logically derivable from another nor translatable without remainder into the terms of another.  
Hence the inadequacy, for Dewey, of any ethical theory analogous to a logical theory or 
mathematical theory that can solve any relevant problem with the right method or procedure. 
Compare to Korsgaard, who says “Ethical truth is comparable to logical truth” (2014; cf. 
1996).  Dewey insisted in opposition that there is no logically right method in morals any more 
than there is a right map in cartography as some fixed and final charting of changeless territory, 
or a right climate model, isolated from an inclusive context, specified purposes, and objective 
results (see 1938, LW 12:138-39, 399).  It is not possible to theoretically settle moral problems in 
advance of their occurrence because each variable in moral action “has a different origin and 
mode of operation,” so “they can be at cross purposes and exercise divergent forces in the 
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formation of judgment.”  “The essence of the moral situation is an internal and intrinsic conflict; 
the necessity for judgment and for choice comes from the fact that one has to manage forces with 
no common denominator” (1930, LW 5:280).   
What ethical theory can do, despite (and at times perhaps even because of) its one-sided 
idealizations and emphases, is to help lay bare “the factors causing [problems] and thus make the 
choice more intelligent” (in Koch 2010, 2.2241-2.2245).  In the contemporary ambit of Kitcher 
and Appiah, Dewey approached and evaluated ethical and political theories not on analogy to 
logical or mathematical problems but as experiments in “living together in ways in which the life 
of each of us is at once profitable in the deepest sense of the word, profitable to himself and 
helpful in the building up of the individuality of others” (1938, LW 13:303). 
The 1930 presentation can be read as a blueprint to Dewey and Tufts’ 1932 Ethics.  
Dewey approached his chapters (10-17) in the textbook with a conscious pedagogical goal:  re-
forge historical philosophic tools in light of contemporary needs so that students can use them to 
become more comprehensively conscientious in their deliberations and character development.  
Specifically, instead of egging on the outdated quest for a hierarchy that subdues variety among 
fundamental moral concepts, or merely venturing “an eclectic combination of the different 
theories” (1932, LW 7:180), Dewey’s approach was to help students become more perceptive of 
moral complexity, study and assess their own circumstances in light of prior systems, and 
competently use diverse theories as deliberative tools in predicaments that require practical 
coordination among disparate elements.14   
Reification of Three Independent Factors into Three Foundation Stones  
In a letter to Horace S. Fries [1933.12.26 (07682)] (figure 10.2), <place fig. 10.2 on the facing page 
opposite the callout; credit below image should read:  Used by permission of the Wisconsin Historical 
16 
 
Society, Horace S. Fries papers, Mss 518, box 1, folder 6. > Dewey identified the key conceptual shift 
he made between his 1908 Ethics (MW 5)—and by implication earlier works such as Outlines of 
a Critical Theory of Ethics (1891, EW 2:238-388) and The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus (1894, 
EW 4:219-362)—and the 1932 Ethics.  He had, he wrote, been committed in 1908 to a 
“socialized utilitarianism” that foreshortened moral action from the homogeneous perspective of 
the good.  But he transitioned to a strong axiological pluralism that maintained the distinctness of 
variables in moral action, variables that are selectively emphasized—often to good effect—in 
leading abstract ethical concepts.   
The new typology of “at least three” factors which are in some respects independent was 
the organizing principle of Dewey’s spring 1926 course in “Ethical Theory” at Columbia 
University.  Sidney Hook’s lecture notes on that course contain clarificatory gems that emerge as 
Dewey surveys the history of ethical theory to lay bare “certain categories found to be involved 
in judgments which men actually pass in the course of moral conduct and which concepts have 
become the foundation stones of theories about ethics” (in Koch 2010, 2.2230).15  Where helpful, 
I draw from Hook’s notes in what follows.    
To recap Dewey’s hypothesis, moral situations are heterogeneous in their origins and 
operations.  They elude full predictability and are not controllable by the impositions of any 
abstract monistic principle.  Moral life has at least three distinct experiential roots that cannot be 
encompassed in one ideal way to proceed.  Hence, most importantly, there is no foundation stone 
of ethics, whether procedurally constructed or “foundational” in the now old-fashioned sense.  
The unpublished typescript clarifies the hypothesis:  “The three things I regard as variables are 
first the facts that give rise to the concept of the good and bad; secondly, those that give rise to 
the concept of right and wrong; thirdly, those that give rise to the conception of the virtuous and 
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vicious.  …What I am concerned to point out [is] that the concrete conflict is not just among 
these concepts, but in the elements of the actual moral situation that, when they are abstracted 
and generalized, give rise to these conceptions” (Dewey, undated ms, 2).16  In this section, I 
clarify Dewey’s hypothesis by interspersing the three factors and concomitant concepts, as 
emphasized in the 1930 presentation, with the parallel chapters in the 1932 Ethics (chs. 11-13).  I 
hope at least to expose Dewey’s own generalizations to scrutiny so that the promises and 
limitations of his approach can be critically evaluated.  
First Factor:  Good 
The Good as a leading category in ethics arises from desires and aspirations.  People have 
purposes they aim to realize; pervasive wants, drives, appetites, and needs that constantly 
demand satisfaction.  Yet what seems good in the “short run” may not in fact be durably good.    
The isolated satisfaction we anticipate and crave may not be judged satisfactory when we take a 
wider view, so we need practice and wisdom to thoughtfully discriminate between the real good 
and the mirage.  Consequently, the teleological conception of a good that approvably speaks to 
human aspirations is “neither arbitrary nor artificial” (1932, LW 7:309).  When we act hastily 
without reflective foresight, we just follow the strongest inclination and fulfill a desire without 
taking its measure.  “But when one foresees the consequences which may result from the 
fulfillment of desire, the situation changes” (1930, LW 5:282).  Foresight involves judgment and 
comparison as we envision consequences ex ante and track them ex post.   
The capacity to imaginatively crystallize possibilities and transform them into directive 
hypotheses is explored in Dewey’s theory of dramatic rehearsal in deliberation (e.g., 1922, MW 
14, ch. 16; cf. Fesmire 2003, ch. 5).  We rehearse in a developing social and historical context, 
and judgments can be “examined, corrected, made more exact by judgments carried over from 
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other situations; the results of previous estimates and actions are available as working materials” 
(1930, LW 5:282).  Consequently, we learn to organize and thoughtfully prioritize desires, and 
this led historically to candidates for the “chief good,” the summum bonum (e.g., Aristotle 1999, 
Book I), such as hedonistic pleasure, Epicurean wisdom, success (e.g., Plato 1992, Book I; Plato 
1960), egoistic satisfaction, self-realization,
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 and asceticism.  When this factor is uppermost, 
reason is conceived as “intelligent insight into complete and remote consequences of desire” 
(1932, LW 7:217).  The contemplated action is right and virtuous because it is truly, far-
sightedly good; it is wrong and vicious because it is short-sightedly bad. 
As a contemporary example, in Singer’s hedonistic utilitarian approach to “effective 
altruism,” reason calculates the objectively best quantifiable way to “maximize the amount of 
good you do over your lifetime” (Singer 2015, 65; cf. 198n10).18  One need not be morally “on 
the clock” 24/7, but for Singer weighing your options to maximize the true, objective good that 
you do is what it means to be moral.  For example, if you can work for Goldman Sachs and 
donate excess income to effective charities, you may do more life-saving good than if you 
espouse a deontological “do no harm” principle and refuse to participate in the capitalistic 
financial system due to its putative unfairness.  The good you do justifies your participation, 
unless you could have aggregated more good in some other way.  If struggling against structural 
inequalities adds up to the most good you can do, then it is justified, but fighting for justice is not 
good in itself regardless of its utility.  For Singer, answering a moral problem bears a strong 
analogy to answering a math problem.  It requires us to calculate payoffs and pitfalls, debits and 
credits, and thereby determine the objective good (145).  For instance, what priority should we 
give to expenditures on decreasing existential risk (from asteroids, etc.)?  Singer quotes Bostrom, 
who deduces via utility calculations that it should be our highest global priority:  “If benefiting 
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humanity by increasing existential safety achieves expected good on a scale many orders of 
magnitude greater than that of alternative contributions, we would do well to focus on this most 
efficient philanthropy” (174). 
Dewey responded to mathematizing approaches in the unpublished typescript:  Appeals 
to “the dictates of conscience,” intuition, a moral calculus, moral law, or divine command 
acknowledge moral puzzlement, but they mask existential uncertainty when they presuppose 
“that the answer to a moral problem is already licit, like the answer to a problem in a text on 
arithmetic that it only remains to figure correctly.”  Moral problems, Dewey held, typically bear 
little analogy to elementary arithmetic tasks in a schoolchild’s textbook, or to being stumped by a 
hard puzzle.  When puzzling over the square root of 81, there is a clear-cut way to formulate the 
problem and a right solution to calculate, so the only real problem is temporary ignorance of the 
answer.  In moral life, however, “Genuine uncertainty is an essential trait of every moral 
situation” (Dewey, undated ms, 1).   
Dewey is not simply commenting upon the uncertainty due to the difficulty of a puzzle, or 
to lack of access to relevant information to plug into our diagnostic machinery.  He contended 
that a typical quandary about which choice to make among viable alternatives cannot even in 
principle be definitively formulated and finally answered by assembling data and then 
calculating profits and losses on an accounting spreadsheet, as neo-Benthamites persist in 
supposing.  Dewey should have acknowledged that utilitarianism’s economic-mathematical 
balancing model can function well as a heuristic for some purposes.  What he rejected was the 
quest for a predetermined metric whereby we judiciously weigh matters so that the balance tips 
toward the good—many contemporary economists and policy analysts say “optimal”—outcome 
supported by a universal principle.  Dewey acknowledged easy cases in which habituated rule-
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following may economize deliberation, but insofar as an approach fails to prioritize sensitivity to 
context, creative social inquiry, and experimental understanding of complex underlying 
structures, its actual result is too often reminiscent of an offhanded criticism that Dewey once 
made about “popcorn” solutions:  put the right amount in the right mechanism and you get some 
“unnutritious readymade stuff” that will not sustain anyone for long (1951.02.14 [14090]: Dewey 
to Max C. Otto).   
Second Factor:  Duty 
The way we express our cares, make sense of situations, and deal with problems is acquired 
through interaction with the physical, cultural, and interpersonal environment in which we are at 
home.  Classic Greek theorists acquired through a sociocultural medium their intellectual habits 
of pulling toward the good, just as Roman and British theorists acquired habits of pulling 
respectively toward the right and virtuous.  
Dewey argued that the intimacy of the Greek polis supported teleological intelligence and 
the idea that laws reflect our rational ability to patiently set and achieve purposeful goals 
together.  Accordingly, theories of the good made sense to the ancient Greeks.  The vast 
conglomeration of peoples in the Roman Empire, however, supported the development of 
centralized order and the imposition of demands.  As a result, in the historical transition from 
Greek teleology to Roman law, as exemplified by the Stoics, compliance with authorized duty 
was placed at “the centre of moral theory” (1930, LW 5:284).   
The resultant jural or deontological theories cover a fact in ordinary human behavior:  We 
unavoidably make claims on each other through living together, such as the control of desire and 
appetite, companionship and competition, cooperation and subordination.  Others’ demands 
seem arbitrary unless they square with our own purposes, and our demands in turn seem arbitrary 
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to them.  We don’t like to have our desires impeded and regulated, sorted into the forbidden and 
the permitted.  So “there finally develops a certain set or system of demands, more or less 
reciprocal according to social conditions, which are… responded to without overt revolt.”  In this 
way, Dewey proposed, authorized rights and duties evolve, and continue to evolve, through 
demands and prohibitions on others’ behavior.  “From the standpoint of those whose claims are 
recognized, these demands are rights; from the standpoint of those undergoing them they are 
duties.”  This “constitutes the principle of authority, Jus, Recht, Droit, which is current” (284).   
According to Dewey, duty as a leading concept arises, then, from authoritative control 
which imposes a ban on individual satisfactions and temptations.  As such, the concepts of duty 
and the right are in many cases independent, in both existential origin and logical operation, from 
the concept of good.  The good pivots on the element of aspiration; the right pivots on the 
element of exaction.   
 Because imperatives often inhibit the satisfaction of desires, the concept of duty is not, 
as Kant recognized, “reducible to the conception of the good as satisfaction, even reasonable 
satisfaction, of desire” (1932, LW 7:214).  Nonetheless, as Kant also recognized, there is no 
moral quality in being bound by an authority we deem ultimately arbitrary.  When my young son 
was grabbing and picking flowers in a public garden a few years ago, we told him “don’t pick 
the flowers.”  He experienced this as an imposition in which a good was curtailed.  If he begins 
to concur that it is reasonable for his liberty to be thus restrained, what began as enforced 
compliance may be converted into something with moral standing, something right.  It would 
then operate as a moral demand that he acknowledges he should not refuse to meet.   
Dewey here distinguishes the origins of each root factor from its eventual operations.  
That which operates, say, as a good may have had its origins in duty.  A demand that comes to 
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one as a duty operates via compliance, but one may eventually identify the injunction with an 
end one aspires to realize so that it operates as a good.  If down the road my son desires to help 
that garden flourish, what began as an alien requirement that thwarted a desire to grab flowers, 
and may grow into something right to which he personally realizes the wisdom of submitting, 
may become a good.  The same might eventually be said of his enforced duty to go to school.  
That is, cultivating the garden (or going to school) may enter his personal aspirations, despite its 
origins in obedience to communal regulations, “but when this happens, it loses its quality of 
being right and authoritative and becomes simply a good” (1930, LW 5:285).19  Moreover, there 
are hybrid theories which happily defy tidy categorization.  Rule utilitarianism, for example, 
operates in the main via compliance with universal rules, albeit rules theoretically justified solely 
by the welfare they are supposed to maximize:  if you aspire to maximize the good, then conform 
to the rule. 
In sum, “the Good is that which attracts; the Right is that which asserts that we ought to 
be drawn by some object whether we are naturally attracted to it or not” (1932, LW 7:217).  
When the latter factor is uppermost, reason (or, for some deontologists, a presumed innate 
faculty of conscience) is conceived as “a power which is opposed to desire and which imposes 
restrictions on its exercise through issuing commands” (217).  It is good and virtuous to do it 
because it is right; it is bad and vicious because it is wrong.  In consequence, to the degree that a 
deontologist is a monist, there are no morally relevant aspects of virtue or good that cannot be 
organized under the concept of duty, right, law, and obligation.  To will what is right because it 
is right, and not because it is prudent, is consequently a common idea in moral judgments, and 
the category of lawful duty and compliance with constraints of the right is thus taken by many to 
be the foundation stone of ethics. 
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In the 1932 Ethics, Dewey applies these insights to Kantian deontology.  According to 
Kantians, what is morally Good “is that which is Right, that which accords with law and the 
commands of duty” (214-16).  Contemporary representatives include Rawls (1971), Donagan 
(1977), Gewirth (1978), Darwall (1983), and Korsgaard (1996).  Central to his conception of 
justice as fairness, for example, Rawls distinctively holds with Kant that a deontological 
principle of right must take priority over consequentialist concepts of good (1971, 31; cf. 
Freeman 2007, 72).  Rawls references The Critique of Practical Reason:  “the concept of good 
and evil must not be determined before the moral law…, but only after it and by means of it” 
(Kant 2002, 37).  One should, contra Singer, struggle against inequality or strive to change an 
unjust system independent of the net utility of what you’ve chosen.  For Kantian deontologists, 
the good is a path to the right, and the right gets its governing authority by reasonably obliging—
or in Korsgaard’s idiom on the “source of normativity,” moral obligations are assigned by 
autonomous consciousness (1996; cf. Schaubroeck 2010).  Fully complying with your duty and 
thereby at least attitudinally intending to uphold the rights of others is what it means to be moral.     
In Dewey’s naturalistic and pragmatic view, how do social expectations take on 
justifiable moral authority?  That is, how does Dewey reinterpret the locus and ground of 
rightfulness without falling back on God, the state, an inner law of pure practical reason, a law of 
nature, or idealized rational actors?  The relationships that naturally bind us—say, as parents and 
children, friends, spouses or partners, and citizens—expose us to “the expectations of others and 
to the demands in which these expectations are made manifest.”  This is equally true of social 
demands within institutions and political alliances.  Explicit and implicit claims and demands are 
“as natural as anything else in a world in which persons are not isolated from one another but 
live in constant association and interaction” (1932, LW 7:218).  Although a child, friend, spouse, 
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or citizen might be arbitrarily coerced into slavish conformity by despotic power, this is 
experienced as a brute imposition without moral standing.  Expectations become moral claims 
because, even when inconvenient or exasperating, conscientious parents, friends, spouses, or 
citizens respond to relations of parenting, friendship, marriage, and citizenship as “expressions of 
the whole” to which they belong rather than as extrinsic impositions (218).  “If we generalize 
such instances, we reach the conclusion that right, law, duty, arise from the relations which 
human beings intimately sustain to one another, and that their authoritative force springs from 
the very nature of the relation that binds people together” (219).    
In his pragmatic-operational reconstruction of duty and the right, Dewey observed that in 
moral life we must meet the demands of the situation, which requires us to perceive and 
comprehensively respond to more than our own private satisfactions.  The word duty is apt for 
those all-too-familiar occasions in which our own preferences or narrow desires run the other 
way, at cross-purposes from relational demands that should not be shirked merely because they 
may be irksome, discomforting, inconvenient, or perilous.  Not only are Kantians right that we 
cannot rationally will a world of shoplifters or liars; they are also right to call for an inner 
sentinel alert to the exceptions we make of ourselves.  Who better than Rawls, for example, for 
shining a light on the way we benefit from a practice while shirking to do our share in sustaining 
that practice for others? (cf. Appiah 2017, 203)
20
  Kantians typically reject such aspectual 
pragmatizing as an abdication of morality; nevertheless, Dewey agrees with Kant that “to be 
truthful from duty is …quite different from being truthful from fear of disadvantageous 
consequences” (Kant 1993, 15).  In sum, duty, right, and obligation are concepts that serve an 
experiential function as one constant and distinctive stream of morals.  Kant’s mistake was to 
hypostatize this factor and sharply separate moral conduct from our natural aspirations and 
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practical purposes, inferring that “All so-called moral interest consists solely in respect for the 
law” (14n14).   
Third Factor:  Virtue 
Dewey asserted in the 1930 presentation:  “Empirically, there is a third independent variable in 
morals” centered on praise and blame, approval and disapproval, reward and punishment (LW 
5:285).  “Acts and dispositions generally approved form the original virtues; those condemned 
the original vices” (286).  Approving and disapproving attitudes, in all of their popular variability 
and inconsistency within and across social groups, mark the virtuous as an independent primitive 
factor in morals.  This factor differs fundamentally, at least in principle, from the deliberative 
pursuit of ends—which virtue theorists regard as too intellectualistic—or the demand for 
compliance—which virtue theorists regard as too legalistic.  When teleological thinkers consider 
social approval, it is their ends to which they are devoting effort.  Meanwhile, deontologists use 
praise and blame as sanctions for right and wrong (Dewey, undated ms, 10).  “But as categories, 
as principles, the virtuous differs radically from the good and the right.  Goods, I repeat, have to 
do with deliberation upon desires and purposes; the right and obligatory with demands that are 
socially authorized and backed; virtues with widespread approbation” (1930, LW 5:286).  Virtue 
ethicists extend this initial emphasis on acts that are praiseworthy or blameworthy to a search for 
consistency and coherence about which durable traits of character ought to be approved or 
censured.  So they need some non-arbitrary standard of approbation to critique the “original” or 
spontaneous virtues and discover more appropriate and defensible ones.  Typically they turn, like 
Anscombe, to some eudaemonistic conception of living well together. 
In the Fries letter (figure 10.2), Dewey credited his unconventional meta-ethical 
typology—which upends simple categorization of Aristotle as a virtue ethicist, or Mill as an 
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aggregator of good consequences—to careful re-reading of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
British moral philosophers such as Hume, Smith, Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick.  This re-reading 
unfolds in Hook’s 1926 course notes (in Koch 2010), and it led Dewey to a Jeckyll-and-Hyde 
recasting of utilitarianism:  the Benthamite strain has persisted as a teleological orientation mired 
in “an untenable hedonism,” whereas Mill more securely received and renewed the torch of 
moral sentiment theory (e.g., Hume, Smith) by shifting the focus away from what we should do 
in pursuit of pleasures (e.g., Should I retaliate for what he did?) and toward cultivation of 
character (e.g., Should I be someone disposed to follow anger’s directives?).  “Although Mill 
never quite acknowledges it in words, a surrender of the hedonistic element in utilitarianism” 
enabled him to develop, or mostly develop, a robust welfarist standard implicit in our 
approbations that favors “worthy dispositions from which issue noble enjoyments” (1932, LW 
7:245). 
For both Hume and Smith, sympathetic sentiments were the singular source of morality.  
Hume wrote in the Treatise (regarding moral judgment) that “Sympathy is the chief source of 
moral distinctions” (1978, 618).21  Sympathy necessarily brings approval, while antipathy brings 
disapproval.  That is, we approve because we sympathize, and whatever calls out this sentiment 
we call good.  Still, it’s not just that we have antipathy toward Iago’s treachery; for both Hume 
and Smith, our moral sentiments are subject to correctives and regulation by rational 
considerations.  Dewey observed of moral sentiment theory:  “In individuals, the exercise of 
sympathy in accordance with reason—i.e., from the standpoint of an impartial spectator, in 
Smith’s conception—is the norm of virtuous action” (1935, LW 11:11).22  The job of reason, for 
Smith, is to inform and secure the correctives of an impartial standard of approbation so that it 
plays a formative role in critically reflective ends.  Reason seeks “a standard upon the basis of 
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which approbation and disapprobation, esteem and disesteem, should be awarded” (1932, LW 
7:255).
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Published discussions of Dewey’s pluralism, including my own, have hitherto discussed 
utilitarianism of all stripes under the category of the good.  But this is a half-truth, as becomes 
clear when carefully considering Smith’s approach to the problem of non-arbitrary standards that 
do not simply kowtow to customary ridicule and esteem.  This problem is uppermost in 
sentiment theory, Dewey argues, “even when the writer seems to be discussing some other 
question” (1930, LW 5:286).  Again, within sentiment theory what is good or dutiful is derived 
from what our sentiments approve and disapprove.  We spontaneously sympathize with and 
favor benevolent actions that serve others, while ill will arouses antipathy.  For Hume and Smith, 
ethical theory gives its seal of rational approval to the implicit standard in such judgments:  “the 
Good must be defined in terms of impulses that further general welfare since they are the ones 
naturally approved” (Dewey, undated ms, 10).  In this way, according to Dewey, Hume and 
Smith accounted for both aspiration (the good) and compliance (duty) in terms of what they took 
to be the more fundamental fact of approval and disapproval (virtue).  Nineteenth century British 
utilitarianism inherited this legacy, as is especially evident in Mill’s focus on social sympathy, 
but in Dewey’s view it illogically tried to combine “Dr. Jekyll” with “Mr. Hyde”:  (a) the pursuit 
of general welfare as the legitimate standard implicit in social approval (or reproach) of 
dispositions and practices with (b) the hedonistic notion that individual pleasure is the summum 
bonum.   
In sum, Dewey holds that for monistic theories rooted in the third factor, a practice or 
disposition such as generosity, courage, honesty, industriousness, curiosity, or compassion may 
be judged good and dutiful because our moral sentiments approve (and ought legitimately to 
28 
 
approve) it as virtuous; a predisposition such as miserliness or retaliatory payback is bad and 
wrong because it is vicious (and rationally merits disapproval).  To the degree that virtue 
theorists are monists—and Hume was a pluralist of sorts, at least with respect to fundamental 
conflicts among moral ends (see Gill 2011)—they infer that all morally relevant aspects of good 
or duty can be systematically organized under the concept of virtuous character traits, that is, 
traits we should approve because they are contributory to a rationally defensible conception of 
living and being well.  Monistic virtue theorists hold that cultivating stable behavioral traits that 
are as virtuous as possible is what it ultimately means to be moral.  Or, to update Dewey’s 
analysis, the virtue theorist must at least fictionalize (see Alfano 2013) reliably stable traits of 
character—the sort of traits that situational psychologists are now claiming we are incapable of 
exhibiting in the requisite trans-contextual way (Appiah 2008, ch. 2). 
Conclusion:  Beyond Moral Fundamentalism 
Dewey concluded “Three Independent Factors in Morals” with a call for imagination to be more 
perceptive and responsive to the situations in which we must act.  Moral problems are 
entanglements, so theories will be ill-suited to practical conditions whenever “zeal for a unitary 
view” oversimplifies and standardizes moral life (1930, LW 5:288).  Striving for systematic 
coherence can be a philosophic virtue.  The problem is that traditional monists oversimplify 
moral experience by abstracting some factor as central and uppermost, hypostatizing it, then 
treating this factor as the self-sufficient starting point for moral inquiry and the foundational 
bedrock for all moral justification.  The popular habit of singling out one trump value among a 
wide range of values tracks the same pattern and perpetuates the same problems.
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To summarize Dewey’s proposal, traditional concepts of good, duty, and virtue arise as 
distinct categories that express different experiential origins, and none operates as the bottom 
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line that can accommodate all that is of moral worth in the rest.  Hence, no single factor of moral 
life is the central and basic source of all moral justification.  When our moral deliberations (our 
reflective excursions into what is possible) begin with the troubled situation—with a practical 
predicament rather than a theoretical starting point (Pappas 2018)—we discover that diverse 
factors are already in tension with each other.
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  Our foremost practical need is for fine-tuned 
habits that enable us to continuously coordinate and comprehensively integrate these tensions.  
Theories and practices that place primitive experiential factors in interplay and open a 
communicative field between them can better inform our moral deliberations.  Dewey sought to 
analyze leading categories through which ethical theories have concentrated attention on these 
vital factors, in order to put them in communication for the sake of more intelligent choices. 
The primitive strands discussed herein are conceptually distinct and have independent 
sources, Dewey argued, but in actual experiences they are intertwined and “cut across one 
another.”   Needs arise in which we must search for a way to reconcile them to each other by 
weaving them into a tapestry of action that more-or-less satisfactorily expresses the original 
tensions that set the problem at hand (Fesmire 2003, ch. 7).    
In addition to such practical needs, there is a need for theoretical projects reconciling 
diverse factors.  Such projects could change the terms of debate within and between ethical 
traditions.  Dewey approached historical ethical theories, traditional codes of conduct, and legal 
history as data for inquiry, not as finalities to be accepted or rejected wholesale (1932, LW 
7:179; cf. Koch 2010).  Future research in ethics could follow him in rejecting zero-sum 
theorizing.  This would open a door for research recasting ethical theories as compensatory 
emphases, in dynamic tension with other emphases.
26
  Classic moral philosophies were forged in 
part as idealized tools to interpret and deal with social situations.  Their enduring practical value 
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for personal and social inquiry can be liberated—and Dewey’s concern was to liberate, not to 
endorse or dismiss— by reforging traditional tools so that pretty good theoretical work stops 
getting in the way of better.   
Dewey signaled a future for philosophical research in which we advance the growth of 
ethical traditions by rejecting both the quest for, and the tone of, finality in favor of 
experimentally developing robust communicative projects with distinctive dominant emphases, 
angles, and inferences.  For example, Kant’s corpus as a whole was more empirically informed 
and humane than is revealed in standard readings (Louden 2002), and a modified, non-
absolutistic, broadly Kantian pluralism in ethics, fronting rough conformity to duty, has been 
plausibly defended as more than an oxymoron (Hill 2000).
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  As Neiman observes, we do not 
have to flee to an otherworldly metric or fancied preestablished harmony to see that “sometimes 
morality and self-interest part company” (Neiman 2008, 20).  The monistic Kantian inference 
that morality is thus nothing but autonomous willing in accord with universal law, or that 
conformity with duty is what morality essentially is (unlimited by the purpose at hand and 
wholly apart from whatever damage we imprudently though dutifully do), flows not from logic 
but from a hidden premise of theoretical correctness.  That premise persists wherever anti-
consequentialism is declared the victor in a theoretic prizefight, or wherever consequentialists 
overlook the practical bearings of attitudes and predispositions, of will.  We enable this premise, 
or give it a “pass,” at the cost of finding practical footholds to secure dignity and respect.   
Should we abandon the quest for theoretical correctness in ethics, and if so, what then?  If 
being theoretically correct implies a completely enlightened ideal standpoint secured prior to 
confronting difficulties in particular contexts, a standpoint from which our general habits of 
moral thinking will be completely adequate to meeting every situation, then it is increasingly 
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essential that we should abandon the quest for it.  If, on the other hand, one understands 
“correctness” in an operative sense, as in “The map to the pub was correct,” then it is a sensible 
ideal to strive for theories that help us to better navigate messy terrain (Fesmire 2015, 53-59).   
The monistic quest for theoretical correctness can obstruct communication, constrict 
imagination, and underwrite bad choices.  Getting beyond it would place ethical theorizing on a 
stronger footing, especially for dealing with those intractable and ubiquitous “wicked problems” 
in which problem formulation is itself among the key problems (because in these cases even the 
most sincere and informed participants formulate problems and interpret facts differently).  
When we see a moral or political problem only as given, not taken, the chief problem is 
presumed to be that others do not get the problem (see Norton 2015).
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  Or the main problem is 
presumed to be the general failure of the public, or of other nations, to adopt our brilliant 
solutions.  Never mind the unnoticed parts of the mess occluded by our well-defended general 
principles, which are often assumed to be value-neutral and free of interest-driven 
rationalizations and inherited biases.  If we think our diagnosis of the problem is incorrigible and 
has precisely captured all that is morally or politically relevant, then we will predefine what is 
relevant, and we will covertly prejudge alternative formulations.  
What happens, then, to opportunities for learning our way together across a spectrum of 
values?  In public disputes, from the local to the international, vying camps enlist enthusiasm 
through an evaluative conquest, restricting sympathies to a singular channel.  They typically 
demand this to the logical exclusion of democratic attempts to secure shared toeholds to achieve 
social goals.  In this way, moral fundamentalism, logically propped up by monism’s assumption 
of theoretical correctness, offers a deep channel for our partialities and dearest inclinations, but it 
risks antagonism toward excluded standpoints, closure to being surprised by the complexity of 
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many situations and systems, neglect of the context in which decisions are made, and a related 
general indifference to public processes and integrative values.  This is a recipe for failed 
communication and bad decisions.   
Moral fundamentalist habits, and the monistic one-way assumption that exercises and 
reinforces them, are obstacles to cultivating habits of moral and political inquiry that are better 
fitted to contemporary predicaments.  We cannot create static utopias, but we would be better off 
if we would experiment with how far we can go in creating a shared cultural context for inquiry 
that checks both our inveterate moral fundamentalism and the reactionary nihilism that is 
fundamentalism’s mirror image.  An actual result of opposing “their” moral fundamentalism 
with our own is to perpetuate the root problem.  To ameliorate the morasses we face, we need a 
more genuinely radical approach:  we need confidence and resistance without puritanical 
zealotry, courage in mediating troubled situations without expectation of absolute certainty, 






Citations of John Dewey’s works are to the thirty-seven-volume critical edition published by 
Southern Illinois University Press under the editorship of Jo Ann Boydston.  In-text citations 
give the original publication date and series abbreviation, followed by volume number and page 
number.  For example: (1934, LW 10:12) is page 12 of Art as Experience, which is published as 
volume 10 of The Later Works. 
33 
 
Series abbreviations for The Collected Works: 
EW The Early Works (1882–98) 
MW The Middle Works (1899–1924) 
LW The Later Works (1925–53) 
 
Citations of Dewey’s correspondence are to The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-2007, 
published by the InteLex Corporation under the editorship of Larry Hickman.  Citations give the 
date, reference number for the letter, and author followed by recipient. For example: 1973.02.13 
(22053): Herbert W. Schneider to H. S. Thayer. 
 
Alexander, Thomas. 2013. The Human Eros. New York: Fordham University Press. 
Alfano, Mark. 2013. Character as Moral Fiction. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2009. “Toward a Non-Ideal, Relational Methodology for Political 
Philosophy: Comments on Schwartzman’s Challenging Liberalism.” Hypatia 24, no. 4: 130-145.  
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2013. The Imperative of Integration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (January): 10. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2008. Experiments in Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2017. As If: Idealization and Ideals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
Aristotle. 1999. Nicomachean Ethics.  Trans. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. 
34 
 
Boisvert, Raymond D., and Lisa Heldke. 2016. Philosophers at Table: On Food and Being 
Human. London: Reaktion Books. 
Darwall, Stephen L. 1983. Impartial Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Dewey, John. Undated manuscript (mss102_53_3). “Conflict and Independent Variables in 
Morals.” Morris Library, Special Collections, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. 
Dewey, John, and James H. Tufts. 1908. Ethics. MW 5. 
Dewey, John. 1916. Democracy and Education. MW 9. 
Dewey, John. 1922. Human Nature and Conduct. MW 14. 
Dewey, John. 1925/1929. Experience and Nature. LW 1. 
Dewey, John. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. LW 2. 
Dewey, John. 1929. The Quest for Certainty. LW 4. 
Dewey, John. 1930. “Three Independent Factors in Morals.” LW 5:279-288. 
Dewey, John, and James H. Tufts. 1932. Ethics. Second edition. LW 7. 
Dewey, John. 1938. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. LW 12. 
Dewey, John. 1938. “Democracy and Education in the World of Today.” LW 13:294-303. 
Donagan, Alan. 1977. The Theory of Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Dworkin, Ronald. 20l1. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Edel, Abraham. 2001. Ethical Theory and Social Change: The Evolution of John Dewey’s 
Ethics, 1908-1932. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.   




Fesmire, Steven. 2003. John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Fesmire, Steven. 2015. Dewey. London and New York: Routledge. 
Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political 
Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Frierson, Patrick. 2006. “Applying Adam Smith: A Step Towards Smithian Environmental 
Virtue Ethics.” In Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser (eds.), New Voices on Adam Smith.  
London and New York: Routledge. 
Gewirth, Alan. 1978. Reason and Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gill, Michael B. 2011. “Humean Moral Pluralism.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 28, no. 1: 
45-64. 
Glaude, Jr., Eddie S. 2007. In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion. New York: Pantheon. 
Haidt, Jonathan, and Fredrik Bjorklund. 2008. “Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About 
Moral Psychology.” In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 2, The 
Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 181-218. 
Haidt, Jonathan. 2016. http://moralfoundations.org/; accessed February 20, 2018. 
Heisenberg, Werner. 1958. Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. New 
York:  HarperCollins. 
Hill, Thomas E. 2000. Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.   
36 
 
Hume, David. 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
James, William. 1977. A Pluralistic Universe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Johnson, Mark. 2014. Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of 
Cognitive Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Johnson, Mark. 2018. “Dewey’s Radical Conception of Moral Cognition.” In Steven Fesmire 
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Dewey. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.   
Kant, Immanuel. 1993. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. James W. Ellington. 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. 
Kant, Immanuel. 2002. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company.    
Karsten, Jack, and Darrell M. West. 2016. “Inside the Social Media Echo Chamber.” Brookings, 
December 9, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/12/09/inside-the-social-
media-echo-chamber/; accessed February 20, 2018.  
Kitcher, Philip. 2012. Preludes to Pragmatism: Toward a Reconstruction of Philosophy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Kitcher, Philip. 2014. The Ethical Project. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Koch, Donald (ed.). 2010. The Class Lectures of John Dewey. Volume 2. Ethical Theory (1926) 
Class Lecture Notes by Sidney Hook. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corp, 2.2230-2.2284. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Korsgaard, Christine M. 2014. University of Groningen Interview on Ethics and Morality. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzBLPDt-Bl0; accessed February 20, 2018. 
37 
 
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Trans. Catherine Porter.  Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna de, and Peter Singer. 2014. The Point of View of the Universe: 
Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Louden, Robert B. 2002. Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McKenna, Erin. 2018. Livestock: Food, Fiber, and Friends. Athens, GA: University of Georgia  
Press.  
McKenna, Erin, and Andrew Light (eds.). 2004. Animal Pragmatism. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press. 
Mill, John Stuart. 1986. On Liberty. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. 
Mills, Charles W. 2005. “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.” Hypatia 20, no. 3:165–184.  
Mills, Charles W. 2017. Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Neiman, Susan. 2008. Moral Clarity: A Guide For Grown-Up Idealists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Noddings, Nel. 2013. Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Second 
edition. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Norton, Bryan. 2005. Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Norton, Bryan. 2015. Sustainable Values, Sustainable Change: A Guide to Environmental 
Decision Making. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.   
38 
 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 1990. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Pappas, Gregory. 2008. John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press. 
Pappas, Gregory. 2018. “The Starting Point of Dewey’s Ethics and Sociopolitical Philosophy.” 
In Steven Fesmire (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Dewey. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press.   
Plato. 1960. Gorgias. Trans. Walter Hamilton. New York: Penguin. 
Plato. 1992. Republic. Trans. G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. 
Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Schaubroeck, Katrien. 2010. Interview with Christine Korsgaard. The Leuven Philosophy 
Newsletter 17: 51-56. www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/Schaubroeck.Korsgaard.pdf; 
accessed July 12, 2017. 
Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and The Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sen, Amartya. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Singer, Peter. 2015. The Most Good You Can Do. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Sullivan, Shannon. 2018. “Dewey and Du Bois on Race and Colonialism.” In Steven Fesmire 
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Dewey. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.   
Taylor, Charles. 1982. “The Diversity of Goods.” In Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.), 
Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 129-135. 
39 
 
Thompson, Paul. 2010. The Agrarian Vision: Sustainability and Environmental Ethics. 
Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. 
Thompson, Paul. 2015. From Field to Fork:  Food Ethics for Everyone. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Valentini, Laura. 2012. “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 
7 / 9: 654–664.   
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Notes 
                                                            
1
 For example, Paul Thompson observes of the food movement that “Advocates of both 
biotechnology and organic systems too often compare the most advanced and optimistic 
interpretation of their favored approach to the least successful applications of the alternative” 
(2015, 252).  The result has been dichotomized either/or thinking, which comes attended by 
tendencies to oversimplification, ignoring context, and quests for purity (cf. Boisvert and Heldke 
2016).  
2
 Monistic ethical theorists join pluralists in rejecting the arrogance that characterizes popular 
moral fundamentalist habits.  Nevertheless, moral fundamentalism cannot logically stand without 
its monistic premise.  I argue that we are better off without this premise.  It is both empirically 
unwarranted and morally troubling, and there is little to be said in favor of it that cannot be 
accommodated by pragmatic pluralism. 
3
 It would be fruitful, thought beyond the scope of this chapter, to compare and contrast Dewey’s 
form of pluralism with other contemporaneous styles, such as W.D. Ross’s intuitionist pluralism 
in The Right and The Good (1930).  
4
 Haidt (2016) hypothesizes five moral foundations that operate as underlying universal 
intuitions:  Care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, 
sanctity/degradation.  Dewey cautioned against innatist/universal instinct theories, and Haidt’s 
theory could be strengthened by restatement in terms other than innate and universal modular 
foundations.  For development of this line of criticism, see Johnson 2014. 
5
 Rawls proposed a division of labor between ideal and nonideal theories.  The former’s job is to 
determine “what a perfectly just society would be like” (1971, 8-9), whereas nonideal theories 
are tasked with discerning principles to deal with nonideal conditions in which people do not 
comply with the principles of justice, as with war or racial oppression, or in which conditions 
make perfect justice unrealizable.  We need to start by constructing an ideal theory, Rawls 
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thought, if we are to construct a moral compass for dealing with nonideal conditions.  Anderson, 
Mills, Appiah, Pappas, and others are arguing that he was mistaken. 
6
 See Sullivan 2018 and Glaude 2007 to consider whether Dewey historically fared any better. 
7
 The idea that we should bring experimental method to bear on value inquiry traces most 
notably back to Hume’s Treatise, the full title of which was:  A Treatise of Human Nature:  
being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method into Moral Subjects.   
8
 Cf. Kitcher 2014 as well as Mill’s (1986) On Liberty on “experiments of living” (65). 
9
 This is perhaps the most distinctively “pragmatist” feature of Dewey’s ethical theory. Cf. 
Alexander 2013. 
10
 Originally published as “Trois facteurs indépendants en matière de morale,” trans. Charles 
Cestre, in Bulletin de la SFP 30 (October-December 1930): 118-127.   
11
 A copy of the typescript was available to Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flowers, who 
introduced the 1985 critical edition of the 1932 Ethics.  This typescript was subsequently 
misplaced until 2016, when it was retrieved in a careful search by staff at Morris Library, Special 
Collections, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. 
12
 I am indebted to Richard Bernstein for this insight (personal communication). 
13
 Rawls (1993) hoped to do this with his politics of “overlapping consensus” (1993), regardless 
of how one appraises his conception of “public reason” as a viable means to this end.  
14
 In his theory of moral judgment and knowledge (1932, LW 7, ch. 14), beyond my scope in this 
chapter, Dewey argued that the “comprehensive object” of moral choice is the option one 
foresees ex ante as most reliably expressing the situation’s conflicting factors and recovering its 
dynamic equilibrium.  Importantly, in Dewey’s experimental view we must act and also see.  Re-
vision, review ex post is equally essential.   
15
 In these lectures, Dewey struggled with whether right and duty are fundamentally different 
concepts.  For example, he explored Sidgwick’s notion in Methods of Ethics that the right is the 
“Rational Good,” which Sidgwick contrasted with a merely natural good (cf. Lazari-Radek and 
Singer 2014). 
16
 Dewey’s typos silently corrected throughout. 
17
 Some commentators misrepresent Dewey’s mature ethics as an ethics of self-realization.  Not 
only would this be a monistic reduction, but he argues in the 1932 Ethics in a Kantian vein that 
self-realization as an ideal may deaden people to the experiences of others so that we value them 
like pleasantries. 
18
 Singer’s The Most Good You Can Do (2015) is among the most engaging and teachable books 
available in contemporary practical ethics. 
19
 Along these lines, yet outside my scope in this chapter, Edel (2001) argues that Dewey 
respects the independence of each factor while making the content of each “responsible to the 
idea of the good” (11).   
20
 For Dewey the general social demand to do our fair share is justified in practice, not by 
compliance with the first principles of idealized contractors. 
21
 In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith (1790) followed Hume in tracing the source of 
morals to the principle of sympathy:  “By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation” 
(I.I.2).   
22
 Often neglected by scholars drawn to Smith’s (1790) influential treatment of sympathetic 
imagination, Smith discusses the “impartial spectator” in terms of prescriptions and approvals of 
the authoritative “judge within the breast” (VI.iii.17-19).  He writes:  “When we first come into 
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the world, from the natural desire to please, we accustom ourselves to every person we converse 
with . . . .   [Yet] the fairest and most equitable conduct must frequently obstruct the interests or 
thwart the inclinations of particular persons, who will seldom . . . see that this conduct . . . is 
perfectly suitable to our situation.  In order to defend ourselves from such partial judgments, we . 
. . . conceive ourselves as acting in the presence of . . . . an impartial spectator who considers our 
conduct with the same indifference with which we regard that of other people” (Smith 1790, 
III.ii.36; cf. Frierson 2006, 148-9). 
23
 As deontologists fully appreciate, one’s own hankerings may run counter to the 
“comprehensive object” of moral choice.  But akin to Foot, and taking a cue from Hume and 
Smith, Dewey was skeptical of the Kantian contention that our moral mettle is truly revealed 
only when we are motivated to pursue the comprehensive object by the force of reason 
independent of desire (Foot 1978, 161; cf. Trianosky 1990).  Deweyan moral artistry (Fesmire 
2003) does not rely on dispassionate pure reason (Kant), comparison to a world of agents fully 
compliant with the demands of justice (Rawls), detached moral bookishness (utilitarianism), or 
separation from the intimacy of our own yearnings (all of the above).  Even in situations in 
which the comprehensive object has its origins in social demands, it is a matter of moral 
significance for Dewey that it be desired as (a hypothetical) good, not just coolly and 
disinterestedly assented to as dutiful.   
24
 For example, in environmental policymaking economic criteria are typically presumed to have 
supremacy over other key values (aesthetic, spiritual, recreational, ecological, etc.).  See Norton 
(2005, 2015). 
25
 He states this most clearly in the unpublished typescript:  “The three concepts in question 
represent forces that have different roots, not a common and single one.  Because these forces 
pull different ways there is a genuine conflict—and a problematic quality pervades the whole 
situation” (Dewey, undated ms, 3). 
26
 For example, with notable exceptions such as McKenna and Light’s Animal Pragmatism 
(2004) and the work of Paul Thompson (e.g., 2010, 2015), scholars working in the American 
pragmatist grain have taken a back seat to utilitarian and Kantian philosophers in responding to 
the far-reaching impact of human practices on other species and rising concern about animal use 
and treatment. Due to this neglect, the debate has been more anemic than it might have been.  
Abandoning the quest for a fully enlightened ideal standpoint may help us to secure a more 
comprehensive Rawlsian reflective equilibrium in animal ethics and in other areas of practical 
ethics. 
27
 To my knowledge Kantian pluralism has yet to be substantively defended in the “strong” sense 
of pluralism advocated herein.  [As an aside to readers of this pre-proof version:  Nor am I 
sanguine that such a defense is imminent.  It is a logical prospect, albeit a psychological stretch.  
Anti-naturalistic and absolutistic habits are deeply entrenched. -sf] 
28
 It is a truism that people happily weigh in on matters concerning which they are incompetent, 
but no problem is so bad that we cannot make it worse through our way of dealing with it.   
29
 Research on this chapter was supported in part by a 2016 fellowship at the University of 
Edinburgh, Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities.  In addition to helpful dialogue on 
this project with peers at professional conferences, as well as with colleagues and students at 
Middlebury College and Green Mountain College, I am grateful to Erin McKenna and Anthony 
Weston for critical feedback on an earlier draft.  
